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JURY SELECTION DATA AS A
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Ronald F. Wright*
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In this Article, the authors look atjury selectionfrom the viewpoint of
citizens and voters, standing outside the limited boundaries of constitutional challenges. They argue that the composition ofjuries in criminal
cases deserves political debate outside the courtroom. Voters should use
the jury selection habits ofjudges and prosecutors to assess the overall
health of local criminaljustice: local conditions are unhealthy when the
full-time courtroomprofessionalsbuildjuriesthat exclude parts ofthe local
community, particularlywhen they exclude members of traditionallymarginalized groups such as racial minorities. Every sector of society should
participatein the administrationof criminaljustice.
Thispoliticalproblem starts as a public recordsproblem. Pooraccess
to records is the single largest reason why jury selection cannot break out
of the litigator'sframework to become a normal topicfor politicaldebate.
As describedin PartIII, the authors worked with dozens ofstudents, librarians, and court personnel to collectjury selection documentsfrom individual case files and assembled them into a single database, which we call
"The Jury Sunshine Project. " The database encompasses more than 1,300
felony trials and almost 30,000 prospectivejurors.
PartIV presents some initialfindingsfrom the Jury Sunshine Project
to illustrate how public data might generate political debate beyond the
courtroom. PartVexplores the possible explanationsfor the racialpatterns
observed injury selection. Some accounts of this data point to benign non-
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racialfactors as the real explanationfor the patterns observed. Other interpretationsof the data treat these patterns as a new type ofproofof discriminatory intent: evidence that cuts across many cases might shed new
light on the likely intent of prosecutors, defense attorneys, or judges in a
single case. A thirdperspective emphasizes the community effects of exclusionfrom jury service. Finally, Part VI generalizesfrom the data about the
race ofjurors to ask more generally how accessiblepublic records could
transform criminaljustice. Sunshine will open up serious community debates about what is possible and desirablein local criminaljustice systems.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Lawyers treat jury selection-no surprise here-as an issue to litigate. They
file motions, objecting to mistakes by the clerk of the court when she calls a
group of potential jurors to the courthouse for jury duty. After those potential
jurors arrive in the courtroom, lawyers file further motions, testing the reasons
that judges give for removing a prospective juror. The lawyers also watch for
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signs that their opponents might rely on improper reasons, such as race or gender,
to remove potential jurors from the case. Again, there is a motion for that. The
law of jury selection has plenty of enforcers who stand ready to litigate.
In this Article, we stand outside the litigator's role and look at jury selection
from the viewpoint of citizens and voters. As citizens, we believe that the composition ofjuries deserves political debate outside the courtroom. Voters should
consider the jury selection habits of judges and prosecutors when deciding
whether to re-elect the incumbents to those offices. More generally, jury selection offers a stress test for the overall health of local criminal justice. Conditions
are unhealthy when full-time courtroom professionals build juries that exclude
parts of the local community, particularly when they exclude traditionally marginalized groups such as racial minorities. Every sector of society should play a
part in the administration of criminal justice.
This political problem starts as a public records problem. As we discuss in
Part II of this Article, the legal doctrines related to jury selection focus too much
on single cases, and limited public access to court data makes that myopia worse.
Poor access to courtroom records is the single largest reason why jury selection
cannot break out of the litigator's framework to become a normal topic for political debate.'
The paperwork in the typical case file, found in the office of the clerk of
the court, does record a few details about which residents the clerk called to the
courthouse, which panel members the judge and the attorneys excluded from service, and which people ultimately served on the jury. But many details about jury
selection go unrecorded. And even more important, it is practically impossible
to see any patterns across the case files in many different cases. The clerk normally does not hold the data in aggregate form or in electronically searchable
form. Thus, there is no place to go if a citizen (or a news reporter or candidate
for public office) wants to learn about the actual jury selection practices of the
local judges or prosecutors. There is no vantage point from which to see the
whole of jury selection, rather than the selection of a single jury. 2
Until now. As we describe in Part III, we worked with dozens of students,
librarians, and court personnel to collect jury selection documents from individual case files. Then we assembled them into a single database, which we call
"The Jury Sunshine Project." The paper records, housed in 100 different courthouses, depict the work of lawyers and judges in more than 1,300 felony trials,
as they decided whether to remove almost 30,000 prospective jurors. The assembled data offer a panorama ofjury selection practices in a state court system during an entire year.
In Part IV, we present some initial findings from the Jury Sunshine Project
to illustrate how public data might generate political debate beyond the court-

1. See infra Section IID.
2. For a review ofperiodic efforts to assemble jury selection data related to specialized categories of cases
(particularly in capital cases), see infra Section II.D.
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room. Our analysis shows that prosecutors in North Carolina-a state with demographics and legal institutions similar to those in many other states-excluded
nonwhite jurors about twice as often as they excluded white jurors. Defense attorneys leaned in the opposite direction: they excluded white jurors a little more
than twice as often as nonwhite jurors. Trial judges, meanwhile, removed
nonwhite jurors for "cause" about 30% more often than they removed white jurors. The net effect was for nonwhite jurors (especially black males) to remain
on juries less often than their white counterparts.
The data from the Jury Sunshine Project also show differences among regions and major cities in the state. Prosecutors in three major cities-Greensboro,
Raleigh, and Fayetteville-accepted a higher percentage of nonwhite jurors than
prosecutors in three other cities-Charlotte, Winston-Salem, and Durham. While
there may be reasons why prosecutors choose different jurors than judges or defense attorneys do, why would prosecutors in some cities produce such different
results from their prosecutor colleagues in other cities?
Part V explores possible explanations for the racial patterns that we observed in jury selection. Some accounts of these data point to benign nonracial
factors as the real explanation for the patterns we observed. Other interpretations
of the data treat these patterns as a new type of proof of discriminatory intent:
evidence that cuts across many cases might shed new light on the likely intent of
prosecutors, defense attorneys, or judges in a single case.
A third perspective emphasizes the effects of exclusion from jury service.
This system-wide perspective does not concentrate on what a single attorney or
judge was thinking at the moment of removing a juror. Instead, what matters is
how the work of all the attorneys, judges, clerks, and ordinary citizens in the
courthouse forms a pattern over time. When courtroom actors exclude a portion
of the community from jury duty in a persistent and predictable way, that outcome-regardless of the intent of the actors-undercuts the legitimacy of local
criminal justice.
Finally, in Part VI, we generalize from our data about the race of jurors to
ask more generally how accessible public records could transform criminal justice. We believe that sunshine will open up serious community debates about
what is possible and desirable in the local criminal justice system. By widening
the frame of vision from a litigant's arguments about a single case, the quality of
justice becomes a comparative question. For instance, voters and residents who
learn about jury selection patterns will naturally ask, "How do the jury selection
practices of my local court compare to practices elsewhere?" Researchers and
reporters can answer those questions with standardized public data, comparing
prosecutors and judges with their counterparts in different districts.
Data-based comparisons such as these make it possible to hold prosecutors
and judges directly accountable to the public, in a world where voters generally
have too little information about how these public servants perform their work.
When challengers raise the issue during the re-election campaign of the chief
prosecutor or the judge, and reporters write stories about the latest jury selection
report, it could shape the selection of jurors across many cases.
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With the help of public records-assembled to make it easy to compare
places, offices, times, and crimes-the selection of juries could become something more than an insider's litigation game of dueling motions. The patterns,
visible in those public records, could prompt a public debate about what the voters expect from their judges and prosecutors. It takes a democratic movement,
not just a constitutional doctrine, to bring the full community into the jury box.
II.

CASE-LEVEL DATA AND DOCTRINES

Every defendant has a legally enforceable right to an impartial and representative jury, so lawyers and judges raise constitutional and statutory claims
during criminal and collateral proceedings to protect that right. The litigators'
concerns about jury selection, however, keep the focus narrow. In this Part, we
briefly review some of the legal doctrines that litigators use to enforce the ideals
of jury selection, noting the doctrinal emphasis on single cases.
We then show how current public records laws and the practices of jury
clerks reinforce the single-case orientation of the constitutional doctrine. As a
result, it is nigh impossible to view jury selection at the overall system level. The
existing archival empirical studies of jury selection reflect this difficulty: they
deal with specialized crimes or targeted locations, making it difficult to draw
general lessons about juries and the overall health of criminal justice systems.
A.

Judge Removes Jurorsfor Cause

Before the start of a jury trial, lawyers for the prosecution and the defense
may challenge jurors for cause. The judge, responding to these objections from
the attorneys, must confirm that each potential juror meets the general requirements for service, such as residency and literacy requirements.3 At that point, the
judge also evaluates possible sources of juror bias against the defendant or
against the government.
The "cause" for removal might be a prospective juror's relationship with
one of the parties or lawyers.4 The judge also inquires into the prior experiences
of the jurors; for instance, the judge might ask if any of the jurors was ever a
victim of a crime. A juror who brings prior knowledge about the events surrounding the alleged crime receives special scrutiny. There is no limit to the number
of jurors a judge might exclude on these grounds.
3. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4502 (2016) (declaring that citizens are not qualified to be jurors if they are
"unable to read, write, speak and understand .. . English .. .;" are not able to "render efficient jury service" due
to mental infirmity; or have been "convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year .... ); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.16 (West 2016) (allowing a challenge for cause for jurors with
felony or misdemeanor convictions).
4. Judges encounter special problems during for-cause removals in death penalty cases. A juror who declares that he or she would always vote to impose the death penalty, or not to impose the death penalty, will be
excluded for cause. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520-23 (1968).
5. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 494.470 (2016) ("A prospective juror may be challenged for cause for any
reason mentioned in this section and also for any causes authorized by the law."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A1214(d)-(e) (2016).
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The statutes and judicial opinions dealing with for-cause removals share
two important features. First, the standards defer to trial judges. Appellate courts
apply an "abuse of discretion" standard to these questions and rarely overturn the
trial judge's decision to grant or deny a party's request to remove a juror for
cause. 6 Second, the law of for-cause removal ofjurors looks to one trial at a time.
Any challenge to the judge's decision begins with a review of the court transcript
for evidence of the individual juror's alleged bias. A comparison to some other
juror in the same case might be relevant, but the judge's habits across many
cases-or the actions of the local judiciary more generally during questions of
removal-do not matter for litigators. Indeed, there are no aggregate data sources
that could show how often trial judges remove jurors for cause. Litigators see
this issue case by case, and appellate courts normally conclude that the trial judge
acted within her discretion, whatever she chose.
B.

Attorneys Remove Jurors with Peremptory Challenges

After the parties argue to the judge about removals for cause, lawyers for
the prosecution and defense use peremptory challenges to strike a designated
number of jurors.7 True to the name, peremptory strikes require no explanation.
Perhaps one side wants to exclude jurors with certain political attitudes because
the attorneys believe those jurors may not sympathize with their client's side of
the case. There are only a few ways that lawyers can take their peremptory strikes
too far: they may not use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on race,
gender, or other "suspect" categories for equal protection purposes. To do so
8
would violate the Constitution.
The method for litigants to prove racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges has changed over the years. Under the approach laid out in
Swain v. Alabama,9 a party claiming discrimination had to present evidence
reaching beyond the opponent's behavior in the case at hand. The defendant
would need to show that "in criminal cases prosecutors have consistently and
systematically exercised their strikes to prevent any and all Negroes on petit jury
venires from serving on the petit jury itself."o
Two decades later, the Court in Batson v. Kentucky" expanded the options
for a party trying to prove intentional racial discrimination during jury selection.
A litigant now may rely solely on the facts concerning jury selection in the individual case. Under this analysis, the attorneys try to reconstruct the state of mind
of a single prosecutor (or a single defense attorney) who removed a prospective

6.

See Oswalt v. State, 19 N.E.3d 241, 245 (Ind. 2014); State v. Lindell, 629 N.W.2d 223, 239-40.

7. See OHIO R. CRIM. P. 24(D) (2009) ("[E]ach party peremptorily may challenge three prospective jurors
in misdemeanor cases, four prospective jurors in felony cases other than capital cases .... ); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 40-18-118 (2016) (providing eight strikes for each side in cases punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year but not death, and three for each side if crime is punishable by less than one year).
8. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 237-39 (2005); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
9. 380 U.S. 202, 222-23 (1965); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589 (1935).

10.
11.

Swain, 380 U.S. at 223.
476 U.S. at 96-97.
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juror in a single trial. The relevant factual question is a familiar one in criminal
court: what was the state of mind of a single actor at one moment in the past?
The Batson Court developed an oddly detailed constitutional test: a threestep analysis (plus one prerequisite) for examining invidious racial discrimination in the use of peremptory strikes during jury selection. As a prerequisite, the
litigant must identify jurors belonging to a constitutionally relevant group, such
as a group based on race, ethnicity, or gender. 12 At that point, the moving party
takes the first step by showing facts (such as disproportionate use of peremptory
challenges against jurors of one race, or the nature of the questions posed on voir
dire) to create a prima facie inference that the other attorney excluded jurors
based on race.1 3
Second, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to give neutral explanations for its challenges. The explaining party cannot simply deny a discriminatory intent or assert good faith. The attorney must point to some reason other than
the assumption that jurors of a particular race would be less sympathetic to the
party's claims at trial. 14 Finally, in the third step, the moving party offers reasons
to believe that the other party's supposedly neutral reasons for the removal of
jurors were actually pretextual. On the basis of these arguments, the court decides
if the nonmoving party's explanation was authentic or pretextual.
Critics immediately spotted the potential weakness of the Batson framework and argued that it is too easy for attorneys to fabricate race-neutral reasons,
after the fact, to exclude minority jurors." Appellate courts affirm convictions
even when prosecutors invoke "nonracial" reasons that correlate with race-specific behaviors or stereotypes, 16 and they sometimes affirm when prosecutors

12. See United States v. Mensah, 737 F.3d 789, 803 (1st Cir. 2013) (Asian Americans); United States v.
Heron, 721 F.3d 896, 902 (7th Cir. 2013) (recognizing circuit split and state court split on religion-based challenges); United States v. Roan Eagle, 867 F.2d 436, 440-41 (8th Cir. 1989) (Native Americans); Commonwealth

v. Carleton, 641 N.E.2d 1057, 1058-59 (Mass. 1994) (Irish Americans).
13. See People v. Bridgeforth, 769 N.E.2d 611, 616-17 (N.Y. 2016) (holding that removal of dark-skinned
juror can satisfy step one); Hassan v. State, 369 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (applying step one); City of
Seattle v. Erickson, 398 P.3d 1124, 1131 (Wash. 2017) (holding that removal of only minority juror in pool can
establish prima facie case).
14. See People v. Gutierrez, 395 P.3d 186, 198 (Cal. 2017) (rejecting adequacy of proffered race-neutral
reasons); State v. Bender, 152 So. 3d 126, 130-31 (ruling that prosecutor not required to present arrest records
in order to support race-neutral explanation for peremptory strike); People v. Knight, 701 N.W.2d 715, 730
(Mich. 2005) (finding prosecutor presented adequate race-neutral reasons for excusing prospective jurors).
15. See Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924,928 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("To excuse such prejudice
when it does surface, on the ground that a prosecutor can also articulate nonracial factors for his challenges,
would be absurd.... If such 'smoking guns' are ignored, we have little hope of combating the more subtle forms
of racial discrimination."); Michael J. Raphael & Edward J. Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: NeutralExplanations
Under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 229, 236 (1993) ("[I]n almost any situation a prosecutor
can readily craft an acceptable neutral explanation to justify striking black jurors because of their race.").
16. See United States v. Herrera-Rivera, 832 F.3d 1166, 1173 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that government's
proffered reasons for striking potential juror were not pretextual and that strike was based on juror's having
criminal history and family members who used drugs); United States v. White, 552 F.3d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 2009)
(accepting the explanation that ajuror had "an angry look that she wasn't happy to be here"); Lingo v. State, 437
S.E.2d 463, 471 (Ga. 1993) (prosecutor excluded black male juror who appeared "angry"); Clayton v. State, 797
S.E.2d 639, 643-45 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017) (State's reliance on fact that prospective black juror had gold teeth was
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rely on the race-neutral reason only for nonwhite jurors." Some courts also uphold the use of peremptories where the attorney had mixed motives for the removal and at least one of the motives was nonracial.18 Several studies of published opinions confirm that appellate courts rarely reverse convictions based on
Batson claims. 19
20
Judges stress the fact-specific nature of their rulings on Batson claims.
The Court's latest case involving race and juror selection, Foster v. Chatman,21
reinforced this aspect of the doctrine: to use a bit of an understatement, the case
did not involve subtle discrimination. Documents related to the jury selection in
that case showed that the prosecutors made notations about the race of several
potential jurors, writing the letter "b" alongside their names, highlighting their
names in green, and placing these jurors in a category labeled, "definite NO's."
It is hard to imagine many Batson claims with evidence this strong, certainly not
for cases litigated after attorneys became more sophisticated in preparing for possible Batson claims.22

not race-neutral); State v. Clifton, 892 N.W.2d 112, 126-27 (Neb. 2017) (holding that trial court did not err in
finding race-neutral the prosecutor's rationale that juror had years of alcohol and crack addiction).

17. See Lewis v. Bennett, 435 F. Supp. 2d 184, 191-92 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (striking unmarried juror); State
v. Collins, No. M2015-01030-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 2126704, at *14 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 16,2017) (jurors
had family members affected by drug abuse, prosecutor removed the only black juror).

18.

See Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 810, 817 (9th Cir. 2010) (using comparative analysis of stricken

versus nonstricken jurors rather than a mixed-motive test); Andrew Verstein, The Jurisprudenceof Mixed Mo-

tives, 127 YALE L.J. 1106, 1116-17 (2018).
19. See Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson's Net to Ensnare More Than the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully UnimaginativeAttorney, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 1075, 1092 (2011) (examining 269
Batson challenges in federal court from 2000-2009); James E. Coleman Jr. & David C. Weiss, The Role of Race
in Jury Selection: A Review ofNorth CarolinaAppellate Decisions, N.C. ST. B. J., Fall 2017, at 13-14 (comparing
reversals in North Carolina to other southern states); Daniel R. Pollitt & Brittany P. Warren, Thirty Years of
Disappointment:North Carolina'sRemarkable Appellate Batson Record, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1957, 1961 (2016).

20.

See Gray v. Brady, 592 F.3d 296, 301 (1st Cir. 2010) ("[W]hether to draw an inference of discrimina-

tory use of peremptories is an intensely case and fact-specific question .... ) (quoting Gray v. Brady, 588 F.
Supp. 2d 140, 146 (D. Mass. 2008)). Despite the doctrinal emphasis on fact-specific judicial review ofjury selection, the parties often present formulaic, prepackaged arguments to explain their removal ofjurors. Litigation
in this area has unearthed training materials from local prosecutor's offices, listing ready-made "neutral" justifications that prosecutors might use to overcome a Batson challenge. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cook, 952 A.2d
594, 601 (Pa. 2008) (describing a training video for new prosecutors calling for prosecutors to strike black people
and women from juries and explaining how to conceal discriminatory strikes). Lawyers litigating claims of racial
bias in the North Carolina criminal justice system collected materials demonstrating such prosecutor training
practices. See generally Catherine M. Grosso et al., A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming ImportanceofRace
in Jury Selection in Post-BatsonNorth Carolina Capital Trials, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1531, 1535 (2012). In some
instances, trainers specifically instructed prosecutors to exclude members of racial minority groups from juries.

See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 265-66 (2005) (Dallas County); Robert P. Mosteller, Responding to
McCleskey and Batson: The North Carolina Racial Justice Act Confronts Racial Peremptory Challenges in
Death Cases, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 103, 104 (2012); Brian Rodgers, Local DA Encourages Blocking Blacks
from Juries, Wharton County Prosecutor Says, Hous. CHRON. (Mar. 22, 2016, 9:51 PM), http://www.
houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Local-DA-encourages-blocking-blacks-from-juries-

6975314.php.
21. 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1743-45 (2016).
22. See, e.g., ExparteFloyd, 227 So. 3d 1, 13 (Ala. 2016) (affirming conviction after remand to reconsider
in light of Foster, despite prosecutor use of list designating jurors by race).
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Since the Court decided Batson, critics have proposed improvements to the
test.2 3 Chief among them, scholars persistently call for the abolition of peremptory strikes.24 At the end of the day, however, the Batson test has endured, more
or less in its original form. Batson marks the boundaries of constitutional enforcement and these boundaries do not seem likely to move any time soon.25
C

Venire Selection

Litigants also sometimes object to the composition of the jury venire-the
local residents whom the clerk of the court summons to the courthouse on any
given day for potential jury service. Constitutional doctrine plays only a limited
backstop role here, as it does with peremptory challenges.
The Supreme Court does read the Equal Protection Clause to prevent states
from excluding racial groups from the jury venire by statute. 26 The Court has
also established that defendants may challenge the process of creating the venire,

&

23. See Aliza Plener Cover, HybridJury Strikes, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REv. 357, 372 (2017); Scott Howe,
DeselectingBiasedJuries, 2015 UTAH L. REv. 289, 337 (2015); Nancy S. Marder, Foster v. Chatman: A Missed
OpportunityforBatsonand the Peremptory Challenge, 49 CONN. L. REv. 1137, 1176 (2017) (proposing allowing
defendants to obtain more information, such as prosecutor notes, or inferring discriminatory intent from discriminatory effect or practice); Caren Myers Morrison, Negotiating Peremptory Challenges, 104 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 22 (2014); Anna Roberts, Asymmetry as Fairness:Reversing a Peremptory Trend, 92 WASH.

U. L. REv. 1503, 1541 (2015); cf Andrew G. Ferguson, The Big Data Jury, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 935, 969
(2016).
24. See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 344 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("I continue to believe that we
should reconsider Batson's test and the peremptory challenge system as a whole."); Bellin & Semitsu, supra note
19, at 1107; Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposalto Eliminate Racially DiscriminatoryUses ofPeremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1099, 1149 (1994); Antony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious
Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REv. 155, 179 (2005); Amy Wilson, The End of Peremptory Challenges:A Callfor Change Through ComparativeAnalysis, 32 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
363, 371 (2009); David Zonana, The Effect ofAssumptions About Racial Bias on the Analysis ofBatson's Three
Harms and the Peremptory Challenge, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 203, 241.
25. See Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme Court's Utter Failureto Meet the Challenge ofDiscriminationin Jury Selection, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 501, 528 (decrying the doctrine's "useless symbolism"); Camille A. Nelson, Batson, O.J, and Snyder: Lessons from an Intersecting Trilogy, 93 IOWA L. REv.
1687, 1689 (2008) ("Batson's promise of protection against racially discriminatory jury selection has not been
realized."); Bryan Stevenson, Illegal Racial Discriminationin Jury Selection: A ContinuingLegacy, HUM. RTS.
MAG. (Fall 2010), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human-rights magazine home/humanrights
vol37_2010/fall2010/illegal_racial_discrimination in jury_selection.html. Change might occur instead at the
subconstitutional level. In April 2018, the Washington Supreme Court approved a new procedural rule that removed a showing of discriminatory intent as a basis for disallowing an improper peremptory challenge. See
WASH. STATE CT. GEN. R. 37.
26. In the first case to deal with the question, Strauder v. West Virginia, the Court sustained an equal
protection challenge to a statute excluding black people from the jury venire. 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880). In later
cases, the Court did not require the defendant to show complete exclusion of a racial group from jury service: a
substantial disparity between the racial mix of the county's population and the racial mix of the venire, together
with an explanation of how the jury selection process had created this outcome, would be enough to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination. The government would then have to rebut the presumption of discrimination.
See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977) (underrepresentation of Mexican Americans); Turner v.

Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 359 (1970) (underrepresentation of black people).
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27
a right that stems from the Sixth Amendment's promise of an impartial jury. A
defendant who challenges the venire must show that a distinctive group (such as
a racial group) is underrepresented in the pool, meaning that its jury venire numbers are "not reasonable in relation to" the number of such persons in the community. 28 After showing a gap between the general population and the composition of the venire, the defendant must identify some aspect of the jury selection
29
process that causes a "systematic" exclusion of the group.
Statistics matter in proving the defendant's claim. State courts and lower
federal courts use several different techniques to measure the gap between the
30
presence of a distinctive group in the population and on the jury venire. In that
sense, the litigation related to jury venires places more weight on the pattem of
31
outcomes and less on the intent of particular actors in a single trial. Nevertheless, litigators in this arena still look to a small set of trials-a single venire,
32
typically a single day's worth of trials-for the relevant evidence. Moreover, a
judicial finding for defendants who challenge the composition of the venire is
rare. 3 3 Like the legal doctrines related to judicial removals for cause and litigant
removals through peremptory challenges, the litigation surrounding the jury venire leaves most jury selection choices undisturbed-including some troubling
outcomes.34

D.

Public Records and PastJury Selection Studies

As we have seen, when entire segments of the community remain underrepresented in jury service, constitutional doctrines provide a remedy only in the
most extreme individual cases. They do so without checking the broader context
of courtroom practices. Unfortunately, record-keeping about jury selection compounds the doctrinal problem of single-case myopia.

27. In Taylor v. Louisiana, the Court held that a Louisiana law placing on the venire only those women
who affirmatively requested jury duty violated the Sixth Amendment's requirement that the jury represent a "fair

cross section" of the community. 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
28. Missouri v. Stewart, 714 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
29. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). At that point, the burden of proof shifts to the govemment
to show a "significant state interest" that justifies use of the method that systematically excludes a group.
30. The Court, in Berghuis v. Smith, described three different measures of the participation gap: the absolute disparity test, the comparative disparity test, and the standard deviation test. 559 U.S. 314, 316 (2010); see
also State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801, 826-27 (Iowa 2017) (challenges to jury pools can be based on multiple
analytical models).
31. See Jessica Heyman, Introducingthe Jury Exception: How EqualProtection Treats Juries Differently,

69 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 185, 203 (2013).
32.

Id.

33.

See United States v. Fadiga, 858 F.3d 1061, 1063-64 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that evidence that 20%

of the population in the two counties that provided jurors for the district court were black and that no juror on
defendant's forty-eight person venire was black was insufficient to establish prima facie case of discrimination);

United States v. Best, 214 F. Supp. 2d 897, 902-03 (N.D. Ind. 2002) (holding that jury venire did not violate
Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement, even if percentage of black people in counties from which
venire was drawn was 19.6% and percentage of black people on this venire was only 4.8%).
34. See David M. Coriell, Note, An (Un)FairCross Section: How the Application ofDuren Undermines

the Jury, 100 CORNELL L. REv. 463, 465 (2015).
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State courts maintain records (typically in a nonelectronic format) about the
construction of individual juries: which prospective jurors sat in the box, which
jurors the judge removed for cause, and which jurors the two attorneys removed
through peremptories. 35 But aggregate data is another thing entirely: clerks do
not traditionally compile data on the rate at which parties or judges exclude minority jurors over long periods of time. 36 Even if state courts were to compile and
publish their records to show jury selection practices across many cases, the case
files are not fully comparable from place to place. The lack of data not only
makes it difficult for litigants to ferret out racial discrimination in particular
cases, but it also makes it difficult to identify patterns of behavior that supervisors might address through better training and accountability.3 7
Because of the fragmented nature of public records dealing with jury selection, researchers have not created many databases on this topic, and the limited
data they have managed to collect focus on specialized crimes or on trials in a
handful of locations. Comparisons across many locations, time periods, or types
of crimes have not been possible.
For instance, most of the efforts of scholars and litigants to collect records
about jury selection at the trial court level have related to capital murder trials.

35. Clerks in some states also maintain a record of the order of removal. Jurisdictions vary in how much
information they collect and retain about individual jurors. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8314(a) (West 2016) ("A jury commissioner shall document each . . decision with regard to disqualification,
exemption, or excusal from, or rescheduling of, jury service."); MINN. GEN. R. PRACTICE R. 814 (2017)
("[N]ames of the qualified prospective jurors drawn and the contents of juror qualification questionnaires ...
must be made available to the public . . . ."); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4523(a) (2016) ("The jury selection commission shall create and maintain a list of names of all prospective jurors who have been disqualified and the reasons
for their disqualification. The list shall be open for public inspection.").
36. For an exception, see N.Y. JUD. LAW § 528 (McKinney 2016).
The commissioner ofjurors shall collect demographic data forjurors who present forjury service, including
each juror's race and/or ethnicity, age and sex, and the chief administrator of the courts shall submit the
data in an annual report to the governor, the speaker of the assembly, the temporary president of the senate
and the chiefjudge of the court of appeals.
Id. We are unaware of any state that requires the clerk of the court to collect information about the removal of
jurors from the venire at the case level, in all jury trials, and to report that data routinely, both at the case level
and in aggregate form. See S.B. 576, 2017 Leg. (Cal. 2017) (requiring jury commissioner to develop a form to
collect specified demographic information about prospective jurors, prohibiting disclosure of the form, but also
requiring jury commissioner to release biannual reports with aggregate data).
37. The best overview of these shortcomings in the public records appears in Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O'Brien, A Callto CriminalCourts: RecordRulesfor Batson, 105 KY. L.J. 651, 654 (2017); see also Russell
D. Covey, The UnbearableLightness ofBatson:Mixed Motives and Discriminationin Jury Selection, 66 MD. L.
REv. 279, 322 (2007) ("[TJhere is extremely little evidence available even in a full-blown Batson hearing to shed
much light on the question of whether an explanation is credible."); Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Racial
Discriminationand Jury Selection, 31 CRIM. JUST., Summer 2016, at 43, 45 ("[E]very jurisdiction needs to do a
better job of collecting data both on the composition of the jury venires and on the use of peremptory challenges."); Mary R. Rose & Jeffrey B. Abramson, Data, Race, and the Courts: Some Lessons on Empiricismfrom
Jury Representation Cases, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REv. 911, 954-56 (noting poor quality of juror data that courts
maintain and report).
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Researchers have tallied jury statistics in capital cases in Pennsylvania, 38 North
Carolina,39 South Carolina,4 0 and elsewhere.41
Other studies have ventured beyond capital murder trials but remained limited to a small number of county courthouses. 42 The most comprehensive of these
efforts includes a study of criminal trial juries based on records from two counties in Florida.43 Several studies focused on the creation of the jury venire, prior
to any removals by judges and attorneys. 44 Litigators-perhaps frustrated by si-

38. See David C. Baldus et al., RacialDiscriminationand the Death Penalty in the Post-FurmanEra:An
Empiricaland Legal Overview, with Recent Findingsfrom Philadelphia,83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1662 (1998);
David C. Baldus et al., StatisticalProofof Racial Discrimination in the Use of Peremptory Challenges: The
Impact and Promise of the Miller-El Line of Cases as Reflected in the Experience of One PhiladelphiaCapital
Case, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1425, 1449 (2012).
39. See Grosso et al., supra note 20, at 1533; Barbara O'Brien & Catherine M. Grosso, Beyond Batson's
Scrutiny: A PreliminaryLook at Racial Disparitiesin ProsecutorialPreemptory Strikes Following the Passage
of the North CarolinaRacialJusticeAct, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1623, 1627 (2013).
40. See Ann M. Eisenberg et al., IfIt Walks like Systematic Exclusion and Quacks like Systematic Exclusion: Follow-Up on Removal of Women and African-Americans in Jury Selection in South Carolina Capital
Cases, 1997-2014, 68 S.C. L. REV. 373, 373 (2017); Ann M. Eisenberg, Removal of Women and African Americans in Jury Selection in South CarolinaCapitalCases, 1997-2012, 9 NE. U. L. REV. 299, 302 (2017).
41. See David C. Baldus et al., The Use ofPeremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and
EmpiricalAnalysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 22-28 (2001); Aliza Plener Cover, The Eighth Amendment's Lost
Jurors: Death Qualificationand Evolving StandardsofDecency, 92 IND. L.J. 113, 116 (2016) (qualitative study
of Witherspoon strikes in eleven Louisiana trials resulting in death verdicts from 2009 to 2013); Brandon L.
Garrett et al., CapitalJurors in an Era of Death Penalty Decline, 126 YALE L. J.F. 417, 419 (2017) (survey of
persons reporting for jury duty in Orange County, California, asking questions about eligibility to serve on hypothetical death penalty case); Justin D. Levinson et al., DevaluingDeath: An EmpiricalStudy ofImplicit Racial
Bias on Jury-EligibleCitizens in Six Death PenaltyStates, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 520 (2014) (analyzing nonarchival study of 445 jury-eligible citizens in six death penalty states).
42. Two noncapital studies analyzed single parishes in Louisiana. See LA. CRISIS ASSISTANCE CTR.,
BLACKSTRIKES: A STUDY OF THE RACIALLY DISPARATE USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BY THE JEFFERSON

PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 2 (2003), http://www.blackstrikes.com; Billy M. Turner et al., Race and
Peremptory Challenges DuringVoir Dire: Do Prosecutionand Defense Agree?, 14 J. CRIM. JUST. 61, 63 (1986)
(examining data from 121 criminal trials in one Louisiana parish). Another working paper analyzed 351 jury
trials from Los Angeles County, Maricopa County (Arizona), Bronx County, and Washington, D.C. See JeeYeon K. Lehmann & Jeremy Blair Smith, A MultidimensionalExamination ofJury Composition, Trial Outcomes,
and Attorney Preferences 9 (2013), http://www.uh.edu/-jlehman2/papers/lehmann-smith jurycomposition.pdf.
43. See Shamena Anwar et al., The Impact ofJury Race in Criminal Trials, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1017, 1026
(2012). Some of the single-jurisdiction studies collected data about juries for a remarkably small number of cases.
See Mary R. Rose, The Peremptory ChallengeAccused ofRace or GenderDiscrimination?Some Datafrom One
County, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 695, 697 (1999) (compiling data from thirteen noncapital felony criminal jury
trials in North Carolina; black people were much more likely to be excluded by the prosecution and white people
by the defense).
44.

See MAUREEN M. BERNER ET AL., A PROCESS EVALUATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF JURY

POOL FORMATION IN NORTH CAROLINA'S JUDICIAL DISTRICT 15B, at 2 (2016), https://www.sog.unc.edu/publications/reports/process-evaluation-and-demographic-analysis-jury-pool-formation-north-carolina's-judicial-district; BOB COHEN & JANET ROSALES, RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY IN MANHATTAN JURY POOLS: RESULTS OF

A SURVEY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 1 (2007), http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/social-justice/clore/
reports/Citizen-Action-Jury-Pool-Study.pdf; James Michael Binnall, A FieldStudy of the Presumptively Biased:
Is There Empirical Supportfor Excluding Convicted Felonsfrom Jury Service?, 36 LAW & POL'Y 1, 3 (2014);
Edward J. Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness ofthe Death-QualifiedJury: An EmpiricalStudy of ColoradoVeniremen, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 4 (1970); Ted M. Eades, Revisiting the Jury System

in Texas: A Study ofthe Jury Pool in Dallas County, 54 SMU L. REV. 1813, 1814 (2001).
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lence from the academy-have also assembled some statistics regarding prosecutor exclusions from juries in single counties. 45 Journalists have also assembled
a few localized studies. 4 6
Finally, a few studies have analyzed jury selection in the trial court through
the lens of published opinions. Some studies used these opinions as a way to
understand typical practices in trial courts, despite the selection bias problems
involved.4 7 Other studies based on published appellate opinions restricted their
analyses to the role of appellate judges in this litigation.48
What is missing from the archival research on jury selection is the power
to look across all criminal trials, comparing different jurisdictions and different
types of trials. Without that systemic view, judges and lawyers in one county can
only speculate about whether the findings of specialized studies are generalizable
to their home jurisdiction.
III. THE JURY SUNSHINE PROJECT

Public data, collected routinely in the criminal courts, could expand the
frame of reference. If jury selection records were published in comparable form
across jurisdictions, available without physical travel between courthouses, it
would become feasible to compare one prosecutor's or public defender's office
to another, and to compare one jurisdiction to another. Such comparisons might
be valuable to supervising prosecutors, judges with administrative duties, researchers, voters, or even litigants.
To demonstrate how this data collection might operate, we set a goal to
learn about jury selection for all felony trials in a single year, for an entire state.
We chose felony trials in 2011 in North Carolina.4 9 Our main contribution to the
45.

See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A CONTINUING

LEGACY 4 (2010), https://eji.org/sites/default/files/illegal-racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection.pdf(summarizing statistics indicating racial disparities among prosecutors during jury selection for eight southern states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Tennessee); Grosso & O'Brien,
supra note 37, at 657 (summarizing collection ofjury selection data in capital litigation context).
46. See Steve McGonigle et al., Striking Differences, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Aug. 21-23, 2005 (finding
that in felony trials in Dallas County, Texas, prosecutors tended to reject black jurors, while defense attorneys
tended to retain them).
47. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory
Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 447, 463 (1996) (inferring that criminal defendants make approximately
90% of Batson claims; only 17% of challenges with black people as the targeted group were successful, 13% for
Hispanic people, and 53% for white people).
48. See Shaun L. Gabbidon et al., Race-BasedPeremptory Challenges:An EmpiricalAnalysis ofLitigation
from the U.S. Court of Appeals, 2002-2006, 33 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 59, 62 (2008) (analyzing 184 race-based
peremptory challenge cases, concluding that appellants rarely win such challenges); Pollitt & Warren, supranote
19, at 1962. In light of the challenges of assembling archival data, some researchers opt instead for experimental
studies. See Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race and Jury Selection: PsychologicalPerspectives on
the Peremptory Challenge Debate, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 527, 533-34 (2008).
49. We began this effort in the fall of 2012, so we chose the most recent complete year of records. The
state constitution at the time guaranteed that all felony trials in the state would be tried to a jury. N.C. CONST.
art. I, § 24. Only a few misdemeanor charges were decided by juries: those "appealed" from the district court to
the superior court for a trial de novo. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-271(b) (2016) (providing for appeals from district
court to superior court).
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existing public records was to connect the dots, pulling into one location the insights about public servants and public actions that are currently dispersed among
paper files, voter records, and office websites. Although each data point comes
from a public record, linking them is no easy job. In our case, it became a run
through an elaborate obstacle course.
A.

Traveling to the Courthouses

The first obstacle on the course was to identify trial files, separating them
from the much more common cases that did not produce a trial. The North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts ("NCAOC") reports the number of
charges tried each year, but they do not specify which cases are resolved through
trial and which end with guilty pleas, dismissals, or other outcomes.o NCAOC
declined our request to generate a list of file numbers for all cases that were resolved through jury trials in 2011, citing resource limitations." We needed,
therefore, a path around this obstacle.
52
Putting aside a few customized situations, our most useful strategy relied
on public data from NCAOC to specify the trial cases. NCAOC posts raw data
of court dispositions in a format not easily accessible by the public. After persistent and creative efforts by the information technology staff at our law school,
53
we were able to download this data and format it for our purposes. On the basis
of this NCAOC data, we generated a list of cases that led to a jury trial in each
county.
In all likelihood, our lists from these various sources were incomplete.
Some felony jury trials probably occurred in 2011 that never came to our attention. But based on comparisons between the number of trials we located and the
54
number of trials that NCAOC listed in their annual reports, we are confident
that we obtained a strong majority of the trials for that year. There is no reason

50. Annual case activity reports for felonies, misdemeanors, and infractions appear at Case Activity Reports-FiscalYear 2016-2017, N.C. CT. Sys., http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/SRPlanning/Statistics/CARe-

portsfyl6-17.asp (last visited May 18, 2018).
51. Our contact in NCAOC had cooperated with past data requests, with minimal burden on the office, but
asserted that NCAOC leadership appointed by the governor who was elected in 2012 had instructed employees
not to cooperate with this type of request. Recent litigation established that court records are housed in the clerks'
offices, not in a centralized file housed with the NCAOC. See LexisNexis Risk Data Mgmt., Inc. v. N.C. Admin.

Office of the Courts, 775 S.E.2d 651, 656 (N.C. 2015).
52. A few counties (such as Guilford and Mecklenburg) maintained their own records about the cases that
proceeded to trial. In those cases, we relied on the county clerk's records to identify cases that proceeded to trial.
In one case (New Hanover County), our researcher focused on "thick files" in the collection as a rough proxy for
the cases that went to trial. In other cases, we asked the county clerk to request from the NCAOC a list of trials
for that county. NCAOC treated requests from the county clerk of the superior court as a legal obligation, unlike
statewide requests from scholars.
53. We are grateful to Trevor Hughes and Matt Nelkin for their work on this project.
54. NCAOC data track the number of criminal charges resolved through trials, while our database records
the number of criminal trials, treating multi-charge or multi-defendant cases as a single trial. We collected jury
selection data on 1,307 trials, while NCAOC listed 2,112 charges resolved by jury trial for fiscal year 2011-

2012.
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to believe that our collected trials differ from the remaining trials for any relevant
characteristic.5 5
The typical file for a felony trial, stored in the county clerk's office, contains a jury selection form. The one-page form includes space for twelve separate
jury boxes. In each box, an assistant clerk records the names of the jurors seated
in that box. 56 Other documents in the file indicate the judge, defense attorney,
and prosecutor assigned to the case; the charges filed; the jury's verdict for each
charge in the case; and the sentence that the judge imposed.
In the fall of 2012, we conducted a pilot project in one county to test the
viability of our collection plans, gathering the available file information for a few
dozen trials. From that point forward, we relied on law students, law librarians,
and undergraduate students to travel to most of the clerks' offices for the 100
counties in North Carolina, between early 2013 and the summer of 2015.5' Remarkably, the clerks in 10 of the 100 counties reported that no jury trials at all
occurred in their counties between 2011 and 2013.8
B.

Completing the Picturefor Jurors,Judges, and Attorneys

The clerk in each county summons prospective jurors who reside in that
county, 59 so we knew the name and county of residence of each prospective juror.
Based on the research of Grosso and O'Brien in the capital trial context, 60 we
also knew that North Carolina maintains open public records about jurors who
are also registered voters, so we assigned a cohort of student researchers to pursue the biographical background for each juror.61 Some prospective jurors were
not present in the voter database because they were summoned for jury duty

55. We also plan to keep this research project open for some years and will add further trials to the 2011
data as they come to our attention.
56. We were disappointed to find that some clerks recorded only the fact that a prospective juror was
removed from the box without indicating which courtroom actor was responsible for the removal. We coded
these jurors as "Removed." The jury form also usually indicated the order of removals for any particular actor
(that is, the form showed that a prospective juror was the third peremptory challenge by the defense or the fourth
removal for cause by thejudge) but not the overall order ofremoval ofjurors in the voir dire process. One county
(Guilford) adopted a notation that did capture this information about the overall order of removals.
57. Based on what we learned from the pilot study, we refined a data collection protocol for students, as
recorded in a codebook and standard spreadsheet. The field researchers focused on trials in 2011, but in smaller
counties with very few trials per year, they also collected information for trials in 2010 and 2012. We are grateful
to Elizabeth Johnson, a reference librarian at the school of law, for coordinating this complex field operation. See
Liz McCurry Johnson, Accessing Jury Selection Data in a Pre-DigitalEnvironment, 41 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.,
Summer 2017, at 45, 49.
58. The counties with no jury trials were Bertie, Camden, Chowan, Clay, Franklin, Madison, Mitchell,
Montgomery, Pamlico, and Warren.

59.
60.
61.

SeeN.C.GEN. STAT. § 9-4 (2016).

See Grosso et al., supra note 20, at 1533.
The board of elections provides online data including the name, home address, gender, race, age, and
party affiliation of each voter. See Voter Search, N.C. ST. BOARD ELECTIONS & ETHICS ENFORCEMENT,
https://vt.ncsbe.gov/RegLkup/ (last visited May 18, 2018). A few counties (including Mecklenburg) adopted notation techniques that included a record of each juror's race and gender within the clerk's file. Students worked
on matching juror profiles with voter records between spring 2013 and summer 2016.
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based on their driver's license,6 2 but we did obtain the background information
for a strong majority of the prospective jurors based on the voter database. 63
The file for each trial indicated the judge, prosecutor(s), and defense attorney(s) assigned to the case. For most of these full-time courtroom actors, research assistants were able to identify race, gender, date of admission to the state
bar (a proxy for the actor's level of experience), and the judge's date of appointment to the bench.64
In addition to the case-specific information about each trial and its participants, we also obtained information about each county, judicial district, and prosecutorial district.65 These data points included census information about the population and racial breakdown of each county and case-processing statistics about
each prosecutorial district.
After all of the data road trips and Internet searches were done, we held
records for 1,306 trials. 66 This phase of the Jury Sunshine Project contains information about 29,624 removed or sitting jurors, 1,327 defendants, 694 defense
attorneys, 466 prosecutors, and 129 superior court judges. We connected all of
those bits of information into a single relational database. 6 7

62. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-2(b) ("In preparing the master list [of prospective jurors], the jury commission
shall use the list of registered voters and persons with driver's license records supplied to the county by the
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. . . .").
63. We gave researchers a protocol to follow when deciding whether a prospective juror from the clerk's
records matched a voter from the online board of elections records. The clerks in some offices provided us with
the jury venire lists, which they maintained separately from the files for each trial; the venire lists provided home
addresses for the jurors, increasing our confidence that the jurors listed in the clerk's records matched the voters
listed in the voter records for the county. After clerks learned that we were asking for access to file information
about jurors, some superior court judges issued orders prohibiting the clerks from releasing the juror venire lists
to anyone other than the parties to the case. The North Carolina General Assembly also amended the statute to
restrict access to the addresses and birthdates recorded on the jury venire lists. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-4(b);

2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 166; 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 180.
64. In some cases, this information was available from the public data stored on the site of the North
Carolina State Bar regarding licensed attorneys. See Search for a North Carolina Lawyer, N.C. ST. B.,
https://www.ncbar.gov/for-lawyers/directories/lawyers/ (last visited May 18, 2018). We also learned which office defense attorneys worked in (private firm or public defender's office). In North Carolina, the public defender
service covers sixteen of the judicial districts in the state. The remaining districts operate with appointed counsel.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-498.7. Students followed a written protocol to search in standard locations and a
prescribed order for the professional biographies of the courtroom actors.
65. North Carolina divides the state into forty-four different prosecutorial districts and thirty different superior court districts. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-41. The judicial districts break into eight different divisions;
judges spend six months each year in their home district and six months traveling to other districts within the
division.
66. The NCAOC data list a total of 2,112 charges that were resolved through trial for fiscal year 20112012. The breakdown of charges for individual counties suggests that we obtained the records for almost every
felony trial that occurred in the state during calendar year 2011. The total number of defendants who faced trial
in North Carolina in 2011 remains speculative because each prosecutor retains the discretion to file separate
counts either as separate file numbers in the office of the clerk or as separate counts covered under a single file
number.
67. We checked the quality of the field data during the process of loading county-specific spreadsheets
into the central database. Another statewide version of the data exists in spreadsheet form, as assembled by Dr.
Francis Flanagan of the Wake Forest University Department of Economics. See generally Francis X. Flanagan,
PeremptoryChallenges and Jury Selection, 58 J.L. & EcoN. 385 (2015); Francis X. Flanagan, Race, Gender, and
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IV. ILLUSTRATIVE COMPARISONS OF JURY SELECTION PRACTICES

These data open up a new universe of questions about jury selection and
performance. They shed light on simple descriptive issues about the relative contributions of judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys in building a jury. They
also allow us to compare jury practices in more serious felonies to those in the
trials of lesser crimes. Because the data include the jury's verdict on each
charge, 68 we can compare outcomes for a defendant with a single charge to outcomes in trials with multiple defendants and charges. It is possible to track case
outcomes from juries of different compositions, based on juror age, gender, or
race. Any of these questions might prove interesting to taxpayers and voters who
want to understand their criminal courts.
But you have to start somewhere. In this Part, we present evidence related
to racial disparities in jury service. We treat this as a demonstration project, to
imagine in concrete terms the sort of public debate that might spring up when
jury data become available in accessible form, allowing comparisons among jurisdictions.
Our first observations relate to the flow of prospective jurors through the
courtroom. Table 1 indicates the contributions of each of the three courtroom
actors.
JURORS
16,744
3,277
3,002
4,187
2,414
29,624

%

TABLE 1: TOTAL JURORS REMOVED AND RETAINED

DISPOSITION
Juror Retained for Service
Judge Removed
Prosecutor Removed
Defense Attorney Removed
Removed, Source Unknown
TOTAL

57
11
10
14
8
100

As Table 1 indicates, 57% of the jurors who sat in the jury box ultimately
served on that jury. Defense attorneys were the most active courtroom figures,
removing 14% of the total with peremptory challenges; judges removed 11% of
the jurors for cause; and prosecutors exercised their peremptory challenges
against 10% of the prospective jurors called into the box. Records did not indi69
cate the source of the removal for 8% of the jurors.

Juries: Evidence from North Carolina (2017) (unpublished article) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Flanagan,
North Carolina Jury Evidence].
68. Our field researchers entered separate codes for guilty as charged, guilty of lesser charge, mistrial, and
acquittal.
69. These unexplained removals were based on incomplete records in a few counties. If we assume that
the courtroom actors accounted for the "unknown" removals at the same rate that they did for the recorded cases,
then defense attorneys removed a total of 15% of the pool, judges excluded 12% for cause, and prosecutors
removed I1%.
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We know something about the order of removal because state statute creates a uniform framework for some aspects of the selection process. 70 At the outset, the clerk of the court randomly selects prospective jurors from the venire to
seat in the jury box. The judge instructs the jury about the general nature of the
upcoming trial 71 and then may ask jurors about their "general fitness and competency." 72 The parties "may personally question prospective jurors individually." 73
The judge removes jurors for cause before the parties make their peremptory challenges, basing this decision in part on motions from the attorneys. The
judge rules first on the prosecutor's motions, and the clerk replaces any jurors
removed. After that, the prosecutor exercises challenges to the twelve jurors in
the box. Again, the clerk refills any empty seats before the judge and prosecutor
repeat the process. The defense attorney takes the next shift, asking the judge to
remove jurors for cause and striking any jurors from the group of twelve that the
prosecutor and judge left in the box.7 4 The judge and prosecutor again take the
first turn on any replacement jurors who arrive in the box after the defense attorney is done with the first set of challenges. 75

70.
71.
72.

See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1214.
See id. § 15A-1213.
See id. § 15A-1214(b).

73. The judge sometimes removes jurors for cause before the parties ask their questions, but the judge
always remains free to remove additional jurors in light of their answers to attorney questions. Defense attorneys
examinejurors only after prosecutors tender a complete set oftwelvejurors. See id. § 15A-1214(c).
74. When jurors are replaced at any step along the way, the initiative passes again to the judge and the
prosecutor, who may remove any new juror before the prosecutor "tenders" the newest set of retained jurors to
the defense attorney. See id. § 15A-1214(d), (f). In capital cases, the process may advance one juror at a time.

See id.

§ 15A-1214(j).

75. Local variations in this removal process and gaps in the file records leave us uncertain about the precise
order of removals of jurors from any given trial. For instance, it is possible for the judge and the prosecutor to
retain all twelve jurors initially placed in the box, for the defense attorney to exercise all six of the available
peremptories, and then for the judge and prosecutor to remove some of the replacement jurors for those six boxes.
In most counties, the clerk records the order ofjurors removed by each particular actor (for instance, "D3" would
indicate the third juror removed by defense counsel), but not the order of removals as between parties. Only one
county (Guilford) tracked the order of removal overall.
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A.

DemographicDifferences Among Removed Jurors

DISPOSITON
Juror
Retained
Judge
Removed
Prosecutor
Removed
Defense
Removed
Removed,
Source
Unknown
LTOTAL

TABLE 2: JUROR DISPOSITION, BY RACE OF JUROR
%
UNKNOWN
%
OTHER
%
BLACK
WHITE
3,389
50
324
56
2,628
58
10,402

%

Table 2 indicates the racial breakdown of jurors who were retained and removed. We identified 60% of our jurors as white, 16% as black, and 2% as some
other race (including Hispanic ethnicity). 6 The race was not indicated in our data
for 22% of the jurors.7
The data indicate that black jurors and other nonwhite jurors serve on juries
at a slightly lower rate than white jurors. The retention rate for white jurors was
58%, while the rate for black jurors was 56% and for jurors of other races was
50%.
53

1,729

10

574

12

133

21

841

13

1,437

8

755

16

94

15

716

11

2,960

17

288

6

63

10

876

14

1,351

8

427

9

36

6

600

9

17,879

4,672

650

6,422

76. The voter registration and juror records use the racial categories white, black, Asian, Hispanic, Native
American, and other. Voters self-identify and do not have the option of choosing more than one race. Because of
the small numbers recorded in four of those categories, we combine them into a single "other" category. Based
on current census figures, we believe that these figures underestimate the number of Hispanic or Latino citizens
called for jury service in felony trials today. White residents (excluding Hispanic or Latino ethnicity) comprised
65.3% of the 2010 population, while "Black or African American alone" residents made up 21.5%, and "Hispanic
or Latino" residents made up 8.4% of the state population at that time. See Quick Facts: North Carolina,U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2017), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/NC.
77. These jurors did not appear in the voter database or appeared in the voter database with race not indicated. Jurors not appearing in the voter database were placed into the juror pool in the county based on their
appearance on the list of licensed drivers. The race of licensed drivers is not publicly available data in North
Carolina. If the jurors whose race was unknown were assigned a racial identity in proportion to the rest of the
pool, black jurors would constitute 20% of the pool. Under this scenario, white jurors would constitute 77% of
the total pool, and other races would make up 3%.
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When it comes to the race of the jurors, a remarkable pattern appears in
Table 2. The data show that judges removed nonwhite jurors at a higher rate than
they did for white jurors.7 8 Then prosecutors removed nonwhite jurors at about
twice the rate that they did white jurors. But in the end, defense attorneys nearly
rebalanced the levels ofjury service among races by removing more jurors than
the judges or the prosecutors did and by using their peremptory challenges more
often against white jurors than they did against black and other nonwhite jurors.
To bring these racial effects into focus, we express the differences in the
form of a "race removal ratio." In Table 3, we express the ratio of removal rates
for black jurors to removal rates for white jurors: a ratio of exactly 1.0 would
mean that the judges or attorneys removed black jurors and white jurors in exactly the same percentages. 7 9 A ratio above 1.0 means that the actors removed
black jurors at a higher rate than they removed white jurors. Conversely, a ratio
below 1.0 means that actors removed white jurors more often. We adjusted the
calculations for each courtroom actor to reflect the pool ofjurors available at the
time of that actor's removal decision.80
TABLE 3: REMOVAL RATIOS, BY RACE, FOR COURTROOM ACTORS

ACTOR
Judge
Prosecutor
Defense Attorney

BLACK-TO-WHITE
RATIO
1.3
2.1
0.4

OTHER-TO-WHITE
RATIO
2.1
2.0
0.7

Table 3 indicates that prosecutors excluded black jurors at more than twice
the rate that they excluded white jurors (for a 2.1 ratio, or 20.6% to 9.7%); similarly, they used peremptory challenges against other nonwhite jurors at twice
their rate of exclusion for white jurors (producing a 2.0 ratio, or 19.5% to 9.7%).
Defense attorneys, by contrast, excluded black jurors less than half as often as
they excluded white jurors (with a 0.4 ratio, or 9.9% to 22.2%). Interestingly, the
judges excluded black jurors for cause a bit more often (a 1.3 ratio, or 13.5% to
10.5%) but they excluded other nonwhite prospective jurors at a much higher
rate (with a 2.1 ratio, or 21.7% to 10.5%).

78. The different removal rates for jurors of different races by each of the three courtroom actors are all
statistically significant, using the chi-square test for significance.
79. We calculated this ratio after excluding the removals by unknown parties and the removal ofjurors of
unknown race. In every case, the rate of removal of jurors of unknown race sat in between the rate of removal
for white jurors and for nonwhite jurors.
80. Judges have access to the entire pool. Prosecutors choose from the jurors remaining after the judge has
chosen, while defense attorneys make their decisions regarding the jurors left after the prosecutors and judges
have acted. There is some imprecision in this method because after one of the parties has exercised its full complement of peremptories, the clerk might place additional jurors into the box. While the attomeys may still challenge these additional jurors for cause, the removal depends on establishing the relevant legal basis for removal.
The number of jurors that a party "retains" therefore includes some jurors that the party did not actively choose.
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The gender of prospective jurors complicates the selection patterns. On the
whole, women and men served on juries at much the same rate. Judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys did not differ much in their choices based on gender,
at least when we look at all felony trials together.8 1 When race and gender intersected, however, the courtroom actors each pursued a different strategy.
TABLE

Juror

%

REMOVALS, BY RACE AND GENDER

BLACK

%

53

1,609

255

13

345

58

WHITE
MALE
5,028

57

WHITE
FEMALE
5,346

318

12

813

9

910

10

18

407

15

805

9

625

7

105

6

183

7

1,438

16

1,518

17

186

10

238

9

677

8

671

7

$EMALE

%

%

I DISPOSITION

4: TOTAL

BLACK
MALE
1,011

59

Retained
Judge

Removed
Prosecutor
Removed
Defense
Removed
Removed,
Source
Unknown
TOTAL

1,902

2,755

8,761

9,070

Black male jurors were scarce from the outset. They made up only 6.4% of
the total pool of summoned jurors (compared to 9.3% for black females). Once
the selection process began, judges and prosecutors removed black males at a
higher rate than other jurors. Table 5 summarizes the removal rates for each of
the courtroom actors. 82
TABLE 5: RATES OF REMOVAL OF AVAILABLE JURORS
BLACK
WHITE
WHITE
BLACK

Judge
Prosecutor
Defense

MALE
14.9%
23.6%

9.4%

FEMALE
12.6%

18.5%
10.2%

MALE
10.1%
11.1%

FEMALE
10.8%
8.3%

22.2%

22.1%

81. The retention rate for female jurors overall was 55%; for male jurors it was 55.4%. Judges removed
13% of females and 11.7% of males; prosecutors removed 12.1% of female and 13.8% of male jurors available
to them; defense attorneys removed 21.5% of female and 20.6% of male jurors available to them. It is possible,
on the basis of Jury Sunshine Project data, to compare the treatment of male and female prospective jurors in
particular categories of cases, such as sexual assault or domestic violence charges. We reserve those questions
for another time, concentrating here on the insights one can gain from exploring all felony trials as a group.
82. The percentages in Table 5 are based on the pool of jurors after excluding those with an unknown
removal source. The percentages for prosecutors and defense attorneys also reflect the reduced pool of jurors
available to those actors at the relevant point in the process. The differences in treatment between white and
nonwhite jurors are statistically significant, using the chi-square test. For each group of actors, the p-value is <

0.00001.
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Defense attorneys did not remove male and female jurors of the same race
at meaningfully different rates. Prosecutors, however, used their challenges proportionally more often against black male jurors (striking 23.6% of those available in the pool at that point in the process) than they did against black female
jurors (18.5% of those available). A similar, but less pronounced, gap appeared
in judicial removals for cause: judges removed 14.9% of the black male jurors
and 12.6% of the black female jurors. All told, black males started the process
underrepresented in the pool and ended up comprising only 6% of the jurors who
served.
B.

GeographicalDifferences in JurorRemoval Practices

Judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys have different objectives at a
trial and value different characteristics in jurors. It does not surprise us, therefore,
to find that these courtroom actors produce different demographic patterns when
they choose jurors.
Comparisons within these groups, however, are another matter. What might
explain two different prosecutor's offices that behave quite differently in their
selection of juries? We explored this question through a comparison of the six
largest cities in the state, all with populations larger than 200,000. Table 6 lists
the removal ratios for the courtroom actors in the counties where those cities are
located.

CITY
(COUNTY)
WinstonSalem
(Forsyth)
Durham
(Durham)
Charlotte
(Mecklenburg)
Raleigh
(Wake)
Greensboro
(Guilford)
Fayetteville
(Cumberland)

TABLE 6: REMOVAL RATIOS IN URBAN COUNTIES
Defense
ProsecuProseeiJudges
Judges
Blacktors Othertors BlackOtherBlacktototototoWhite
White
White
White
White
0.6
4.0
3.0
2.7
1.6

Defense
OthertoWhite
0.8

1.1

1.0

2.6

1.5

0.5

0.3

1.0

1.9

2.5

2.3

0.3

0.5

1.2

1.4

1.7

1.9

0.4

1.0

0.9

0.4

1.7

1.6

0.4

1.0

0.9

1.2

1.7

1.2

0.5

0.4

The prosecutor's offices appear to fall into two groups. Greensboro, Raleigh, and Fayetteville all produced a removal ratio of 1.7 for black jurors;
Greensboro and Durham also showed relatively low removal ratios for other

83. Black males make up approximately 11% of the state population overall. We note for future research
the potential relevance of the race and gender of the judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys who select the
jurors.
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nonwhite jurors. On the other hand, the prosecutor's offices in Durham, Charlotte, and Winston-Salem excluded black jurors at a higher rate than elsewhere
in the state. In the most extreme case, the prosecutors in Forsyth County removed
black jurors from the box three times more often than they removed white jurors:
that is, among the 151 black jurors reporting for duty in felony trials, the prosecutors exercised their peremptory challenges to remove 27.5% of the jurors available to them after the judges removed some jurors for cause. Out of 541 total
white jurors, the prosecutors in Forsyth County removed 9.3% of the available
candidates.
One more geographical comparison deserves our attention: the differences
between urban and rural counties. 84 Despite the differences in jury selection
among the six largest cities in the state, urban counties as a group shared some
features that distinguished them from rural counties. Table 7 summarizes the results.
TABLE 7: REMOVAL RATIOS, URBAN AND RURAL COUNTIES

Urban
Rural

Judges,

Prosecutors,

Defense,

Black-to-White

Black-to-White

Black-to-White

1.2
1.1

2.3
1.7

0.5
0.3

1

For the judges and the prosecutors, it appears that the racial disparities in
removal rates are most pronounced in urban counties. Defense attorneys, on the
other hand, produced more racially imbalanced results in rural areas; their ratio
of black-to-white removal rates became even smaller in rural counties.ss
V. PREVIEW

OF A POLITICAL DEBATE

The data from the Jury Sunshine Project speak only to outcomes in the jury
selection process. The numbers show what judges and attorneys did when they
picked jurors, but they do not show why. The competing-and complementaryexplanations for these racial disparities in the jury selection process are a fitting
topic for political debate.

84. We designate the most rural counties as the thirty-three counties with the lowest population densities
in the state. See North Carolina PopulationDensity County Rank, USA.coM, http://www.usa.com/rank/northcarolina-state--population-density--county-rank.htm (last visited May 18, 2018). Among those thirty-three counties, eight conducted no jury trials at all and eleven recorded generic removals without attributing them to the
judge or a party. Those counties made choices regarding 2,706 jurors (or 2,199 when excluding the jurors with
an unknown removal source). For purposes of Table 7, we designated the most urban counties as the eleven
counties with the highest population densities, covering all cities with populations more than 80,000. Those
counties made choices about 13,037 jurors. The racial differences in rates ofjuror removal for each of the actors,
as well as the urban-rural differences reflected in the removal ratios in Table 7, are statistically significant.
85. All three courtroom actors-judges, prosecutors, and defense attomeys-removed fewer available jurors in rural counties than they did in urban counties. Judges removed 15.7% of available jurors in urban counties,
and only 8.1% in rural counties. The comparable figures for prosecutors were 14.3% and 8.4%; for defense
attorneys, they were 22.3% and 12.3%.
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In this Part, we preview the sorts of arguments that prosecutors, judges,
defense attorneys, and interested community members are likely to advance during this debate. Some of these explanations for racial disparity emphasize the
intent of the judges and attorneys when they exclude jurors. Others put intent to
the side and ask instead about the effects of systematic exclusion on defendants
and the community.
A.

Intent-BasedInterpretations

What might explain the patterns in jury selection that we observed in Part
IV? Starting with the defense attorneys, who used their removal powers at the
highest rate, perhaps the simplest explanation is best: they used all the available
voir dire clues (including the race of the prospective jurors) to seat jurors who
were more sympathetic to human frailty, or those who were more skeptical of
local police. Perhaps the use of the jurors' race was the explicit basis for the
defense attorney's choice, or maybe the race correlated with other clues, such as
expressions of general respect for authority. Put simply, defense attorneys may
have used race as one factor to pick a jury to win a trial.
As a matter of trial strategy, such choices are rational. Flanagan used our
jury data to calculate the performance differences among juries of different racial
compositions. He found that juries composed of more black men were more
likely to acquit any defendant. 86 Conversely, juries with more white men were
more likely to convict, particularly when the defendant was a black man.8 ' Thus,
it is easy to see why defense attorneys might want to save more of their peremp88
tory challenges for white male jurors.
As for the judges, it is more difficult to reconstruct the reasons why they
removed a higher percentage of black jurors from the venire. The 30% increase
in the rate of removal among black jurors, when compared to white jurors, might
reflect greater economic stresses among black jurors, such as transportation difficulties or pronounced hardship from missing days away from a job." The
higher rate of judicial removals for cause for nonwhite jurors might also reveal
how judges align themselves with prosecutors, and respond more favorably to
their requested removals for cause.

86. See Flanagan, North Carolina Jury Evidence, supra note 67, at 14.
87. Id. at 13-15. Flanagan used instrumental variable regressions, using the demographic composition of
the randomly selected jury pool as an instrument for the composition of the jury.
88. There is also another possible explanation for the exclusion pattern on the defense side: perhaps defense attorneys were aware that nonwhite jurors were underrepresented on the venire that the clerk called to the
courthouse. Their removal of white jurors, then, might have revealed an effort to restore the jury to a racial
balance that better reflected the community. See BERNER ET AL., supra note 44, at 7.
89. The judges' different treatment of white jurors and nonwhite jurors other than black jurors is equally
puzzling. It might reflect a greater incidence of language barriers within this group, but that is speculation.
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And then there are the prosecutors. One potential explanation for the race
removal ratios higher than 1.0 would be intentional strategic decisions that incorporate race. 90 Perhaps line prosecutors relied on race as a clue about the general receptiveness of jurors to a law enforcement perspective. Like the defense
attorneys, the prosecutors may have relied in part on race to pick a winning jury.
It is also possible that prosecutors removed jurors based on a factor correlated with race-most prominently, jurors with a felony conviction, a prior arrest,
or close family members who had negative experiences in the criminal justice
system. 91 Prosecutors might have been fully aware of the disparate racial impact
of these choices and regretted that unintentional side effect of their removal strategy.
Again, our data suggest that such choices by prosecutors are strategically
rational. Flanagan found that for every peremptory challenge that the prosecutor
used, the conviction rate for black male defendants increased by 2-4%.92
None of these intent-based accounts, for any of the courtroom actors, can
explain jury selection choices in individual cases. Racial disparities in aggregate
jury selection outcomes speak only about averages. They reveal incentives that
shape the larger patterns of removal. These arguments, therefore, might not win
the day in the courtroom under current constitutional doctrine. But the reasons
why prosecutors and judges exclude black jurors (especially males) at a high rate
could be relevant to voters and community groups outside the courtroom as they
discuss local criminal justice conditions.
B.

The Effects of JurorExclusion

A political debate about the exclusion of jurors might extend beyond the
possible intent of courtroom actors. The discussion, based on data-driven comparisons of different places and actors, might also include the effects of juror
exclusion.
Having a diverse jury can have life-changing implications for criminal defendants. White jurors are more likely to convict and are more likely to inflict
harsh punishments on black defendants accused of killing white victims. 93
The exclusion of minority jurors from service also affects the jurors themselves and the community where the trial occurs. Jury service creates a forum for

&

90. Cf Michael Selmi, Statistical Inequality and Intentional (Not Implicit) Discrimination, 79 LAW
CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 206 (2016).
91. See Binnall, supra note 44, at 3; Vida B. Johnson, Arresting Batson: How Striking JurorsBased on
Arrest Records Violates Batson, 34 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 387, 389 (2016); Anna Roberts, Casual Ostracism:
Jury Exclusion on the Basis of Criminal Convictions, 98 MiNN. L. REv. 592, 593 n.12 (2013).
92. See Flanagan, North Carolina Jury Evidence, supra note 67, at 14. Among the 1,327 defendants in our
database, 666 (50%) are black males and 385 (29%) are white males. The race is unknown for 71 male defendants
(5%). There are 74 (6%) black female defendants and 63 (5%) white female defendants.
93. See Bellin & Semitsu, supranote 19, at 1082-83.
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popular participation in criminal justice. 94 When major segments of the community remain outside the courtroom, with other more "favored" people issuing the
verdicts, the legitimacy of the system suffers. Statewide statistics reveal in more
systematic and detailed ways how different parts of the community find it easier
or harder to serve on juries.
1.

Impact on Excluded Jurors

In addition to the harm to criminal defendants, courts have long recognized
that individuals who are excluded because of racial discrimination also experience a cognizable harm. For example, in Carterv. Jury Commission of Greene
County, the Court noted, "People excluded from juries because of their race are
as much aggrieved as those indicted and tried by juries chosen under a system of
racial exclusion." 95
Even when courts have declined to hold that serving on a jury is an enforceable right, they have still agreed that jury service is a "'badge of citizenship'
worn proudly by all those who have the opportunity to do so and that it would,
indeed, be desirable for all citizens to have that opportunity." 96 Many courts have
noted that exclusion of qualified groups not only violates the Constitution but
also undermines "our basic concepts of a democratic society and representative
government." 9 7 When state actors participate in this exclusion, it deepens the
harm. As one court noted long ago, "When Negroes are excluded from jury service because of their color, the action of the state 'is practically a brand upon
them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority. "'98

94.

See AKHIL R. AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 15, 205 (2005); STEPHANOS BIBAS,

THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 70 (2012).

95.
96.

396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970).
See United States v. Conant, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1020-22 (E.D. Wis. 2000) ("While no court has

yet recognized a constitutional right to serve on a jury, the possibility that such a right might exist is to be given
the most careful scrutiny.").

97. See Ciudadanos Unidos de San Juan v. Hidalgo Cty. Grand Jury Comm'rs, 622 F.2d 807, 825 (5th Cir.
1980) (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940)).
It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a
body truly representative of the community. For racial discrimination to result in the exclusion from jury
service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our constitution and the laws enacted under it but is
at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.

Id.; see also Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 303-04 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Qualified Negroes excluded by discrimination have available, in addition, remedies in courts of equity. I
suppose there is no doubt, and if there is this Court can dispel it, that a citizen or a class of citizens unlawfully
excluded fromjury service could maintain in a federal court an individual or a class action for an injunction
or mandamus against the state officers responsible.

Cassell, 339 U.S. at 303-04.
98. White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401,406 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 308 (1879)); see also Nancy Leong, Civilizing Batson, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1561, 1564 (2012) (proposing suits
by prospective jurors to overcome informational obstacles to Batson challenges).
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Impact ofJurorExclusion on the Community

The exclusion of minority jurors also has a detrimental impact on the community. It is a basic notion of democracy that a jury should reflect the community. A jury that is "made up of representatives of all segments and groups of the
community" is "more likely to fit contemporary notions of neutrality" and a combined "commonsense judgment of a group of laymen." 99
The Supreme Court has long recognized the importance of the role of jury
participation in our society and has explicitly examined the impact that such exclusion has on the broader community. For example, in Taylor v. Louisiana,the
Supreme Court recognized the importance in selecting a fair representation of
jury members because of the potential impact on a community.100 The Court explained that the fair representation requirement was essential in (1) guarding
against "the exercise of arbitrary power" and invoking the "commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor," (2) upholding "public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system," and (3) sharing the administration of justice as "a phase of civic
responsibility."'0 1
Systemic exclusion harms the community because jury service creates a
forum for popular participation in criminal justice.1 02 When major segments of
the community remain outside the courtroom, with other people issuing the verdicts, the legitimacy of the system suffers. In Georgia v. McCollum, the Court
explained that improper exclusion of jurors on the basis of race not only affects
the juror, but that the harm also extends beyond the rejected juror "to touch the
entire community"1 03 because discriminatory proceedings "undermine public
confidence in the fairness of our system of justice."104

&

99. See Hiroshi Fukurai, Race, Social Class, and Jury Participation:New Dimensionsfor EvaluatingDiscrimination in Jury Service and Jury Selection, 24 J. CRIM. JUST., no. 1, 1996, at 71, 72 (quoting Apodaca v.
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410 (1972)).
100. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1975).
101. Id. at 530-31 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217,227 (1946)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). Similarly, after the Court's decision inBatson, the Court decided in Powers v. Ohio,
499 U.S. 400 (1991), to expand the right to complain against discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to
defendants who were not members of the same race as the excluded jurors. The harm done to the community's
interest injury service served as a key justification: "Jury service is an exercise of responsible citizenship by all
members of the community, including those who otherwise might not have the opportunity to contribute to our
civic life." Powers, 499 U.S. at 402.
102. See AMAR, supra note 94, at 15, 205; Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The HybridNature of
PoliticalRights, 50 STAN. L. REv. 915, 981-94 (1998) (exploring historical basis for treating jury selection as a
political right affecting the community).
103. 505 U.S. 42, 49 (1992) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986)). The McCollum Court
noted that "[t]he harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the
excluded juror to touch the entire community." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S.
at 87).
104. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87. This is a key insight from the "procedural justice" literature. See Richard R.
Johnson, Citizen Expectations of Police Traffic Stop Behavior, 27 POLICING: INT'L J. POLICE STRATEGIES
MGMT. 487, 488 (2004) (noting that studies have shown that people are more likely to "defer to the law and
refrain from illegal behavior" when police treat them fairly); Tom R. Tyler & Jeffery Fagan, Legitimacy and
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The problems related to the systemic exclusion of racial minorities on juries
are particularly acute when the subject matter of the case involves racial violence.
The Court has long recognized the danger that such cases might create distrust
within minority communities. For example, in McCollum, Justice Blackmun discussed cases involving racial violence in which peremptory challenges had resulted in the striking of all black jurors:
In such cases, emotions in the affected community will inevitably be heated
and volatile. Public confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice system is essential for preserving community peace in trials involving racerelated crimes. Be it at the hands of the State or the defense, if a court allows jurors to be excluded because of group bias, it is a willing participant
in a scheme that could only undermine the very foundation of our system
ofjustice-our citizens' confidence in it.' 0
A homogenous jury, on the surface, does not look like a fair jury. The appearance of prejudice in the jury selection process leads to continuing pessimism
and distrust concerning the operation of the criminal justice system among the
omitted groups.1 0 6 The excluded community perceives that it is "shut out." The
court's participation in discrimination and racism undermines its moral authority
07
as the enforcer of antidiscrimination policies.
The public at large also shares an interest in "demonstrably fair trials that
produce accurate verdicts."108 Diversity itself enhances the deliberations of juries. In Peters v. Kiff,1 09 Justice Marshall identified this contribution of a representative jury:
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded
from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of
human nature and varieties of human experience .... [E]xclusion deprives
the jury of a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected im10
portance in any case that may be presented.'
Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 23 1,

233 (2008).
105. See Tyler & Fagan, supra note 104, at 235-36. The 1980 Miami urban rebellion resulted in the death
of eighteen people and $200 million in property damage and other losses. This rebellion followed an all-white
jury acquitting four white police officers for the beating death of a black insurance executive after a change of
venue from Miami to Tampa and after the defendants had used their peremptory challenges to exclude all black
people on the jury venire. See Ihosvani Rodriguez, McDuffie Riots Shook Miami, SUN SENTINEL (May 16, 2005),
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2005-05-16/news/0505150370_1-liberty-city-blacks-and-police-black-man.
The Florida governor's report of the disturbance specifically identified the practice of excluding black people
from juries in racially sensitive cases as a cause of the riots and a reason for black people in Dade County to
distrust the criminal justice system. GOVERNOR BOB GRAHAM'S DADE CTY. COMM., REPORT OF GOVERNOR'S
DADE COUNTY CITIZENS COMMITTEE 60-61 (Oct. 30, 1980), https://www.floridamemory.com/items/show/

329091?id-1.
106. Adam Benforado, Flawed Humans, Flawed Justice, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/opinion/flawed-humans-flawed-justice.html.
107. See M. Shanara Gilbert, An Ounce of Prevention: A ConstitutionalPrescriptionfor Choice of Venue
in Racially Sensitive CriminalCases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1855, 1928 (1993).
108. BarbaraD. Underwood,EndingRace Discriminationin Jury Selection: WhoseRight Is It, Anyway?, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 725, 749 (1992).

109.
110.

407 U.S. 493 (1972).
Id at503-04.
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In sum, excluding minorities from jury selection has negative implications beyond the harms that a criminal defendant might raise in the courtroom. Like other
systemic issues in the criminal justice system, visible and systematic barriers to
jury service can erode community trust and decrease legitimacy."'
The accountability ofjudges and prosecutors to the community is also compromised when particular races, neighborhoods, ages, or other social groups cannot contribute their fair share to the jury system. In particular, prosecutors who
can exclude parts of the community from jury service effectively shield themselves from full accountability to the public.' 12 They can choose for themselves
which segments of the population will set their priorities in the charging and
resolution of cases.
Whether such disparities are the result of purposeful discrimination is difficult to prove, but even the perception that discrimination is occurring has important implications for the criminal justice system. 13 These practices deserve
scrutiny outside the courtroom, beyond the confines of constitutional doctrine.
VI. ACCESS TO DATA AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM

In Part IV we highlighted data, for illustrative purposes, to address the question of exclusion from juries on the basis of race. But racial equity is only one
possible objective for those who might use open jury data. In this Part, we explain
how file data, made available in a searchable form that is comparable across district boundaries, could create an informed and engaged role for the public in positive criminal justice reform.
A.

The Analogy to Traffic Stop Data

Constitutional doctrines such as Batson have not opened the door to jury
service for minority groups. 1 14 But is there any better (or quicker) alternative than
advocating for changes in the constitutional doctrine? The American experience
with traffic stops and pedestrian stops by police over the last two decades suggest
that there is, in fact, a better way. In that setting, a frustrating and limited constitutional doctrine does not tell the whole story. The increased availability of data
about the patterns of police stops created a political debate that continues to shape
police conduct. Through the political process, members of these communities are

&

111. There is an ironic aspect to the Jury Sunshine Project: publication of data about uneven community
access to jury service might exacerbate the problem by making it more visible. If the public debate never results
in greater equality ofjury service, that outcome is a sobering possibility.
112. This compounds the other weaknesses of the electoral check on the prosecutor's performance in office.
See Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REv. 69, 88-89 (2011); Ronald F.
Wright, How ProsecutorElections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 582-83 (2009).
113. See Stephen Clarke, Arrested Oversight: A Comparative Analysis and Case Study of How Civilian
Oversight of the Police Should Function and How It Fails, 43 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1, 2 (2009); Kami
Chavis Simmons, Beginningto End Racial Profiling:Definitive Solutions to an Elusive Problem, 18 WASH.

LEE J.C.R. & Soc. JUST. 25, 30 (2011).
114.

See supra Section II.B.
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able to insist on changes in police department policies with the aim of reducing
racial profiling.
Just as in the jury selection context under Batson, the Supreme Court's approach to racial profiling under the Fourth Amendment allows law enforcement
officials to cloak constitutionally impermissible conduct in race-neutral terms.
Equal Protection jurisprudence insulates these practices from systemic reform.
The centerpiece of this evasion is Whren v. United States."' The case involved two vice squad officers' decision to stop a car. One possible ground for
the stop was illegal driving (making a right turn without a signal); another plausible reason for the stop was the officers' unsupported hunch that the driver and
passenger were involved in drug distribution. Which was the true reason? The
Court said that it didn't matter. As long as the circumstances give officers reasonable suspicion to believe a driver violated a traffic law, courts treat the stop
as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.116 An officer can use race as a basis
for suspicions about criminal behavior, stop suspects of only one race, and
117
David Harris
shroud those discriminatory stops in race-neutral language.
way: a judithis
stops
pretextual
law
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8

As a result, constitutional litigation standing alone has not changed field
practices very much. Numerous studies conducted over several decades have
demonstrated that law enforcement officers disproportionately select racial minorities for traffic stops, disproportionately search them during these stops, and
9
disproportionately subject minority drivers to "stop and frisk" practices."

115.

517 U.S. 806 (1996); see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,

265 (1977) ("Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."); Carlos Torres et al., IndiscriminatePower: Racial Profilingand Surveillance Since 9/11, 18

U. PA. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 283, 285 (2015).
Whren,517U.S. at 819.
116.
117. See MICHAEL L. B1RZER, RACIAL PROFILING 72 (2013). A few examples confirm the limited power of
equal protection doctrine to respond to racial profiling. In United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 1997),
the court turned aside the defendant's equal protection claim and rejected statistics showing that police disproportionately targeted black people because the officers had a plausible, nonracial reason for detaining the defend-

ant. Similarly, in Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach, 329 F.3d 723, 736 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit
affirmed summary judgment because the appellant failed to provide evidence to refute the officer's race-neutral

explanation for the traffic stop. See also Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 999-1000 (8th Cir. 2003) (denying
relief because plaintiff failed to provide evidence of discrimination to counter the officer's race-neutral justification of the traffic stop).

118.

David A. Harris, RacialProfilingRedux, 22 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 73, 75 (2003).

119. See, e.g., David Barstow & David Kocieniewski, Records Show New Jersey Police Withheld Data on
Race Profiling,N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/12/nyregion/records-show-newjersey-police-withheld-data-on-race-profiling.html; DAVID A. HARRIS, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DRIVING
WHILE BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NATION'S HIGHWAYS ACLU (June 1999), https://www.aclu.org/report/driving-while-black-racial-profiling-our-nations-highways (describing statistics from Maryland and Illinois). More recent data related to New York City's "stop and frisk" policy tell a consistent story. Nearly nine out
of every ten people that the New York Police Department stopped and frisked were completely innocent. Although black people and Hispanic people account for a little over half of the city's population, 83% of the people
stopped were black or Hispanic. See Racial Discrimination in Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/opinion/racial-discrimination-in-stop-and-frisk.html.
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The greater impact of constitutional litigation was delayed and indirect.
Some of the earliest statistical clues about racial profiling practices came to light
during litigation over constitutional claims, which routinely ended in losses for
plaintiffs who wanted to change these police practices.1 2 0 Eventually, advocates
changed the venue for their arguments. They broadened their strategy and took
their claims to legislatures. As a result, many states enacted legislation to address
racial profiling, including some laws that require law enforcement to collect and
report data about their stop practices.
As part of a strategy to prevent racial profiling, about eighteen states now
require, by law, mandatory data collection for all stops and searches.121 Public
agencies now make these data available to the public, sometimes through a centralized entity and at other times through individual law enforcement agencies.1 22
Private individuals and groups have stepped forward as intermediaries to
monitor and interpret these data, making the information accessible and useful
for the public and for policy entrepreneurs. Researchers employed in universities
produced some studies, 12 3 while policy advocacy organizations performed some
of their own analyses.1 24

120.

See Harris, supra note 118, at 78.

See NAACP, BORN SUSPECT: STOP-AND-FRISK ABUSES & THE CONTINUED FIGHT TO END RACIAL
PROFILING IN AMERICA app.1 (Sept. 2014), http://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-issues/racialprofiling/; Patrick
McGreevy, Brown Signs Legislation to Protect Minoritiesfrom Racial Profiling and Excessive Force, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 4, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-pol-sac-brown-racial-profiling20151004-story.html. In 1999, North Carolina became the first state to mandate data collection regarding race
121.

for police who stop drivers. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-902 (2016); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-21.2-5(e) (2016).
122. Since 2002, all state highway patrol and police departments in North Carolina have collected the data
and sent them to the North Carolina Department of Justice, which publishes the data through its website. See
North Carolina Traffic Stop Statistics, N.C. DEP'T PUB. SAFETY, http://trafficstops.ncsbi.gov (last visited May

18, 2018).
123. One such academic study, by Frank Baumgartner, reported that black drivers were on average 73%
more likely to be searched than white drivers in North Carolina. See Frank R. Baumgartner, NC Traffic Stops,
U.N.C. CHAPEL HILL, https://www.unc.edu/-fbaum/traffic.htm (last updated Dec. 13, 2017) (concluding that
Hispanic drivers were 96% more likely to be searched than white drivers and black male drivers were 97% more
likely to be searched, yet black men were 10% less likely to have illegal substances than white men in probable
cause searches; during consent searches, black men were 18% less likely to have illegal substances than their
white counterparts).
In a separate study based on 4.5 million traffic stop records, Sharad Goel and other researchers at Stanford University found that 5.4% ofblack drivers were searched, compared to 3.1% of white drivers. See Camelia Simoiu
et al., The Problem of Infra-Marginalityin Outcome Tests for Discrimination,11 ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 1193,
1206 (2017), https://5harad.com/papers/threshold-test.pdf (revealing that, in nearly every department, black and
Hispanic drivers were subject to a lower threshold of suspicion than their white and Asian counterparts; statewide,
the thresholds for searching white people were 15%, for Asian people 13%, for black people 7%, and for Hispanic
people 6%).
124. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Activists Wield Search Data to Challengeand ChangePolice Policy, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/us/activists-wield-search-data-to-challenge-andchange-police-policy.html. In 2015, the Southern Coalition for Social Justice published an interactive map on
their website that allows a viewer to search the North Carolina stop data by police department. See Open Data
Policing, S. COALITION Soc. JUST., https://opendatapolicingnc.com (last visited May 18, 2018).
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Journalists also found stories within these numbers. Some news outlets reported the results of academic and advocacy studies. 12 5 In addition, teams of reporters created their own analyses, sorting and summarizing the overwhelming
databases for their readers. For instance, the New York Times examined police
traffic stop records between 2010 and 2015. In consent searches in Greensboro,
North Carolina, "officers searched blacks more than twice as often but found
contraband only 21 percent of the time, compared with 27 percent of the time
with whites."

26

The collection, publication, and interpretation of traffic stop data fundamentally changed the conversation. Advocates claim that collecting data about
race is the best way to gather tangible evidence of widespread unconscious bias
toward minorities during police traffic stops. 1 27 Compared to case studies or anecdotal evidence of an individual who was harmed due to police brutality or over28
policing, statistical evidence might persuade a wider range of people.1
The public discussion of data also changes internal management for police
departments. When the police know that data analysts and reporters are watching
them work, they work more carefully.1 2 9 Where this transparency exists, reform
advocates can target more precisely the local police practices that they suspect
are most troubling. In some cases, the data will reveal no problems; in others,
they might confirm for police leadership the factual basis for a complaint that
once seemed amorphous or speculative.1 3 0
When the government collects and publishes data in a format that allows
for comparisons between places, reports give the public and local police leaders
125. See Tonya Maxwell, In Traffic Stops, Disparity in Black and White, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES (Aug.
27, 2016, 2:34 PM), http://www.citizen-times.com/story/news/local/2016/08/27/trafflic-stops-disparity-blackand-white/89096656/ (describing Simoiu et al., supra note 123).
126. See Sharon LaFraniere & Andrew W. Lehren, The DisproportionateRisks of Driving While Black,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/us/racial-disparity-traffic-stops-drivingblack.html (city's driving population is 39% black; 54% of those pulled over were black); see also Matthew
Kauffman, Data: Minority Motorists Still Pulled Over, Ticketed at Higher Rates than Whites, HARTFORD
COURANT (Sept. 22, 2015, 7:02 PM), http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-racial-profiling-0923-

20150922-story.html.
127. LORIE FRIDELL ET AL., RACIALLY BIASED POLICING: A PRINCIPLED RESPONSE 116-17 (2001),
http://fairandimpartialpolicing.com/docs/rbp-principled.pdf; cf Stephen Rushin, Using Data to Reduce Police

Violence, 57 B.C. L. REv. 117, 129-31 (2016).
128.

FRIDELL ET AL., supra note 127, at 128. For a discussion of methodology issues in these studies, see

JOYCE MCMAHON ET AL., U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES, How TO
CORRECTLY COLLECT AND ANALYZE RACIAL PROFILING DATA: YOUR REPUTATION DEPENDS ON IT! 35 (2002),

https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p044-pub.pdf (last visited May 18, 2018). Critics argue that unless the
record of the stop includes very specific data points, down to the cross streets where the stop occurred (which in
many cases is not a required data point), there is no record of which areas of the jurisdiction are facing the most
police presence. The specific location of the stop, according to this argument, is necessary to put the stop into
context.
129. Martin Kaste, Police Are Learningto Accept Civilian Oversight, but Distrust Lingers, NPR (Feb. 21,
2015, 10:18 AM), https://www.npr.org/2015/02/21/387770044/police-are-leaming-to-accept-civilian-oversightbut-distrust-lingers.
130. Sometimes, of course, police leaders offer benign interpretations of the data and deny any need for
policy changes. See Joey Garrison, NashvillePolice ChiefSlams Racial ProfilingReport as 'Morally Disingenuous,' TENNESSEAN (Mar. 7, 2017, 12:58 PM), https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2017/03/07/nashvillepolice-chief-slams-racial-profiling-report-morally-disingenuous/98856754/.
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a benchmark for police performance. One department that stands out from other
law enforcement agencies across the state-either in a positive or negative
way-can reflect on the reasons for those local differences. Similarly, data collected over time may identify trends, allowing police leaders to see in a concrete
way whether a new policy is working.
In sum, the move from constitutional argument in the courtroom to political
argument in the public arena loosened a stalemate on the question of police traffic stops.1 3 1 We believe that something similar can happen if government agencies collect and report jury selection data and if academics, advocates, and jour32
nalists step forward to interpret and publicize those data.1
B.

The Effects of Sunshine Across Different CriminalJustice Areas

The transformative power of data, in our view, is not limited to traffic stops
or jury selection. We place our proposal in the larger context of using transparency to change criminal justice practices for the better.
1.

Use ofData to Regulate a Range ofActors

As Andrew Crespo has pointed out, the criminal courts already collect useful facts that remain hidden because they are scattered in single files or inaccessible formats.1 3 3 An effort to assemble these facts in aggregate form could improve the courts' efforts to regulate the work of other criminal justice players,
such as police and prosecutors.
Careful record-keeping and transparency regarding the collected data already contributes to accountability in diverse parts of the criminal justice system.
In the context of correctional institutions, transparency of data has been instrumental in ensuring fair treatment of prisoners, as Alabama and other states'
courts have held that their state open-record acts apply to prisoners.' 34 While
131. As a result of the New York Times investigation in 2015, the Greensboro police chief ordered officers
to refrain from stopping drivers for minor infractions involving vehicle flaws, which are stops that are subject to
individual officer discretion and stops for which black people and Hispanic people were more likely to be pulled
over. See Sharon LaFraniere, Greensboro Puts Focus on Reducing Racial Bias, N.Y. TIMEs (Nov. 11, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/us/greensboro-puts-focus-on-reducing-racial-bias.html; Oppel, supra note

124.
After having initially rejected protesters' demands, the city [of Durham, North Carolina] ... agreed to require the police . . . to obtain written consent to search vehicles in cases where they do not have probable
Without
w..
the data, nothing would have happened," said Steve Schewel, a Durham City Council
cause .
member ....
Oppel, supranote 124.
132. For an example of news coverage drawing on relevant, but limited, demographic information related
to jury selection, see Pam Kelley & Gavin Off, Wes Kerrick Jury Won't Mirror Mecklenburg's Diversity,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (July 27, 2015, 8:51 PM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article29073877.html (comparing jury pool in the criminal trial of a police officer who shot a suspect with overall
county population demographics).
133. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward InstitutionalAwareness in CriminalCourts, 129

HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2109-10 (2016).
134. See Sarah Geraghty & Melanie Velez, Bringing Transparencyand Accountability to CriminalJustice
Institutions in the South, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 455, 460 (2011).
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correctional institutions have been hesitant to comply, this requirement has shed
light on prison deaths, suicides, beatings, and other prison conduct, hopefully
holding these correctional institutions accountable and giving the legislature a
chance to address misconduct.1 35
Similarly, experts have pushed for increased transparency in the context of
officer-involved shootings, arguing that a lack of transparency surrounding these
incidents has impeded reform.1 3 6 In a test of the reform power of data, President
Obama signed the Death in Custody Reporting Act. 137 This law requires states
and local law enforcement agencies that receive federal money to make quarterly
reports about the deaths of any persons who are detained, arrested, or incarcerated.138 The theory is that national data will help policy-makers "identify not only
dangerous trends and determine whether police use force disproportionately
against minorities, but best practices, and thus ultimately develop policies that
prevent more deaths."l 39 The next few years might reveal whether this government-mandated reporting regime can produce more comprehensive results than
the more decentralized efforts of newspapers and others in the private sector to
14 0
build databases of police-involved shootings.
2.

Internal Management Uses ofData

The practical impact of jury selection data depends, in part, on how prosecutors, judges, court clerks, and others use the data once the information becomes
available. These criminal justice professionals have the capacity to collect for
41
themselves the jury selection statistics and to generate reports on the topic.1
Managers in the prosecutor's office, the chief judge's chambers, or the clerk's
office might be more open to the use of jury selection data if they were to collect
the data themselves.

135.

Id. at 458-63.

136. Mark Berman & Mark Guarino, Chicago Releases 'Unprecedented' Evidencefrom Nearly 100 Investigations into Police Shootings, Use of Force, WASH. POST (June 3, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
100-investigacom/news/post-nation/wp/2016/06/03/chicago-set-to-release-massive-trove-of-evidence-fromtions-into-police-shootings-alleged-misconduct/?utn_term=.dc838ad9f343.

137.
138.

Death in Custody Reporting Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-242, 128 Stat. 2860 (2014).
Id. § 2(a).

139. See Kami Chavis Simmons, No Way to Tell Without a National Database,N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR
DEBATE (July 13, 2016, 10:53 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/09/are-police-too-quickto-use-force/no-way-to-tell-without-a-national-database.
140. See Geoffrey P. Alpert, Toward a NationalDatabaseofOfficer-Involved Shootings: A Long and Winding Road, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 237,238-39 (2015); 2015 WashingtonPostDatabaseofPolice Shootings, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings/ (last visited May 18,
2018) (displaying police shooting data drawn from "news reports, public records, Internet databases and original
reporting").

141.

See Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorsand Peremptories,97 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1485, 1485 n.97 (2012)

(collecting proposals that would require prosecutors to maintain jury selection statistics); Jason Kreag, Disclosing
ProsecutorialMisconduct, 72 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (proposing the use of standardized letters to
disclose prosecutor discovery violations to affected parties).
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On the other hand, data collection mandated by statute, statewide regulation, or rule of procedure could produce more uniform results in different localities and allow for the sort of place-to-place comparisons that make it easier to
diagnose local problems. For example, the Florida legislature recently passed a
pathbreaking law that requires key criminal justice actors to collect and post
criminal justice data in a format that will allow comparisons across localities. 142
A sense of professionalism among judges or prosecutors might motivate
them to take data seriously when it shows a departure from the standard practices
of their colleagues elsewhere in the state.1 4 3 After learning about patterns in jury
selection across many cases, they might change practices on their own initiative.
For instance, accessible data might convince supervisors to train prosecutors to
avoid racial bias during jury selection.
3.

External Public Uses ofData

Internal management use of routine criminal justice data is only half the
story. In the end, we look to public accountability-through the ballot box or
other forms of democratic input into criminal justice practices 144--to convert
jury selection data and other comparable datasets into drivers of change.
The information visible to the public about how prosecutors and judges
perform, compared to their peers, is historically thin. 14 5 That is starting to change.
Private nonprofit organizations, such as Measures for Justice, are funding, collecting, and disseminating data that allow citizens to compare their local courts
to others in the same state and elsewhere.1 46 Data such as this could make it possible to evaluate practices across time and across places. When news reporters,
advocates, academics, and analysts interpret that data for the general public, the
data could shift public priorities. It could create more informed accountability in

142. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 900.05(3), (4) (2018); John Kennedy, Governor Signs Sweeping Court Data
Collection, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE (Mar. 30, 2018), www.heraldtribune.com/news/20180330/governorsigns-sweeping-court-data-collection.
143. See Sidney Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REv. 577, 587-90 (2011) (analyzing the restraining power of professional norms in bureaucracies such as prosecutor's offices).
144. See Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing CriminalJustice Through Contestation and Resistance, 111
Nw. U. L. REV. 1609, 1621 (2017); Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal CourtAudience in a Post-Trial World, 127

HARv. L. REv. 2173, 2177 (2014).
145. See Russell M. Gold, "Clientless" Prosecutors,51 GA. L. REv. 693, 701 (2017); Jason Kreag, ProsecutorialAnalytics, 94 WASH. U. L. REv. 771, 776-77 (2017); Ronald F. Wright, Beyond ProsecutorElections,
67 SMU L. REv. 593, 594 (2014). For a remarkable recent example of a prosecutor committing to regular release
to the public of its own statistics about charging decisions, see Tanveer Ali, Cook County Felony Weapon Cases
Up 43 Percent in 2017, Data Shows, CHI. SuN-TIMES (Feb. 21, 2018, 3:24 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/
news/felony-weapon-cases-up-43-percent-in-2017-county-data-shows (reporting change in office practices
based on data set that Cook County prosecutor released voluntarily).
146. See Overview, MEASURES FOR JUSTICE, https://measuresforjustice.org/aboutloverview/ (last visited
May 18, 2018); Amy Ellis, MacArthur FoundationAwards FIU $1.7 Million to Study ProsecutorBehavior, FIu
NEWS (Mar. 9, 2018, 10:26 AM), https://news.fiu.edul2018/03/macarthur-foundation-awards-fiu-1-7-million-tostudy-prosecutor-behavior/1 20350.
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a world where criminal court professionals get very little feedback from the communities they serve.
We do not claim to know how voters will ultimately react when these data
about the criminal courts become accessible to them. It is possible that in some
places, the most politically engaged members of the community will not care
about jury selection; they might even resist the idea of expanding jury participation to include every population group. But local variety is built into the criminal
justice systems in the United States. 14 7 Voters and engaged community groups
in most places, we hope, will value inclusive practices in their criminal courts
and will expect their agents, operating in the sunshine, to deliver the results.
VII. CONCLUSION
The fulcrum that could move jury practices sits in the office of the clerk of
the court. Public employees in those offices already collect some basic background facts about prospective jurors and record the decisions by judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys to remove jurors or to keep them. And if the clerk's
office is the fulcrum, the lever to shift the entire jury selection process in the
direction of greater inclusion will be public records laws, embodied in state statutes, local court rules, and office policies.
It is startling that public courts, in an age when electronic information surrounds us on all sides, make it so difficult to track jury selection practices across
different cases. It should not require hundreds of miles of driving between courthouses; access to the data should not depend on special requests for judicial approval. 14 8 Information about the performance of public servants in the criminal
courts, in aggregate form, would be easy to collect and to publish. Jury selection
goes to the heart of public participation in criminal justice: this is precisely where
the sun needs to shine first.

147.

See Ronald F. Wright, The Wickersham Commission and Local Control of CriminalProsecution, 96

MARQ. L. REV. 1199, 1200 (2013). But cf William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1973
(2008) (describing decline of local influence in last half of twentieth century).
148. Careful disclosure policies can protect the legitimate privacy interests of jurors without requiring caseby-case judicial approval ofjury selection information. See Grosso & O'Brien, supra note 37, at 667-68; Nancy
J. King, Nameless Justice: The Casefor the Routine Use ofAnonymous Juries in Criminal Trials, 49 VAND. L.

REV. 123, 152 (1996).

